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We identified two new  Chlamydia trachomatis  (CT) 
variants escaping Aptima Combo 2 (AC2) assay detec-
tion, in clinical specimens of two patients. One had a 
C1514T mutation the other a G1523A mutation, both 
within the AC2 23S rRNA target region. The preva-
lence of such variants among persons tested for CT in 
England was estimated to be fewer than 0.003%.
At the end of April 2019, Public Health England (PHE) 
was alerted, via an international Epidemic Intelligence 
System-Sexually Transmitted Infections (EPIS-STI) 
post from Finland, of false-negative  Chlamydia tra-
chomatis  (CT) test results using the Aptima Combo 
2 (AC2) assay (Hologic Inc., San Diego, California, 
United States (US)), a nucleic acid amplification test 
(NAAT) for CT (target: 23S rRNA) and  Neisseria gon-
orrhoeae  (GC) (target: 16S rRNA). Discrepant results 
between the AC2 assay and the Aptima Chlamydia tra-
chomatis assay (ACT) (target: 16S rRNA) were reported 
to have occurred primarily in specimens that had AC2 
relative light units (RLU) from 20 to 84 [1]. These false-
negative AC2 results [2,3] were attributed to a C1515T 
mutation in the CT 23S rRNA gene. In early June 2019, 
Hologic Inc. issued a Field Safety Notice (FSN) to AC2-
using laboratories, recommending ACT reflex retest-
ing of AC2 CT-negative with RLU ≥ 15, CT-equivocal, or 
GC-equivocal/-positive (if CT-negative/equivocal) spec-
imens to ensure detection of the Finnish new variant 
CT strain (F-nvCT) [3]. A European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control (ECDC) rapid risk assess-
ment recommended countries estimate the spread of 
F-nvCT to inform the need for patient recall and retest-
ing [4]. Here we report results from an investigation 
coordinated by a multiagency incident management 
team (IMT) to ascertain the prevalence of new variants 
of  Chlamydia trachomatis  escaping detection by the 
Aptima Combo 2 assay in England.
 
Initial response and risk assessment
The IMT was informed by Hologic Inc. that 42 laborato-
ries in the nine PHE regions in England, one in Isle of Man 
(IoM) and one in Scotland were using the AC2 assay. 
De-duplicated test data from laboratories in England 
extracted from the CTAD  Chlamydia  surveillance 
system [5] showed AC2 assays accounted for 44% 
(1,684,028/3,863,336) of CT tests nationally in 2018.
In undertaking the risk assessment, a local prevalence 
threshold of 0.1% was chosen by the IMT as a balance 
between confidence that any health risk would be mini-
mal and the amount of data that could be obtained from 
all regions within a short timeframe. To inform whether 
a patient recall was indicated, the IMT estimated the 
F-nvCT prevalence in each region by: (i) asking laborato-
ries in England/IoM (IoM was included within the North 
West region) using AC2 to forward weekly AC2 testing 
and retesting data to the IMT (specimens eligible for 
retest were defined as per the FSN, weekly AC2 tests 
reported were compared with April 2018 to March 2019 
average weekly AC2 tests to estimate the likely com-
pleteness of laboratory reporting); (ii) asking laborato-
ries using AC2 to refer discrepant specimens (retested 
specimens found to have a positive result using ACT) 
for reference laboratory investigation; (iii) undertaking 
partial 23S rRNA gene Sanger sequencing [1] to detect 
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mutations in the AC2-CT target region; and (iv) calcu-
lating the one-sided exact-binomial upper 95% confi-
dence interval for new variant CT AC2-negative (nvCT/
AC2neg) prevalence among those tested.
Prospective Chlamydia trachomatis testing 
and retesting data
Four of 43 laboratories expected to report did so via the 
same central laboratory, five laboratories confirmed 
they were not using the test, and two laboratories not 
originally indicated by Hologic Inc. to be using the 
AC2 test also reported data or sent discrepant speci-
mens. By 18 August 2019, 31 of 37 laboratories using 
AC2 reported on 242,505 tests from 1 June 2019. This 
was 79% of the estimated expected number of tests 
(n = 307,779) based on historical laboratory through-
put (Table 1). From 1 June to 18 August 2019, 14,075 of 
242,505 (5.8%) specimens were CT-positive on the AC2 
test and 11,518 of 242,505 (4.7%) were retested (Table 
2). PHE’s reference laboratory received 266 discrepant 
specimens from 26 laboratories.
Noticeably higher retesting rates were seen in London 
and the North West (Table 2). This was considered due 
to factors such as operational differences between lab-
oratories and higher rates of gonorrhoea diagnosis [6]. 
In accordance with the FSN, samples that were positive 
for gonorrhoea were retested.
Reference laboratory analyses
By 18 August 2019, reference laboratory investiga-
tions had been completed on 209 of 266 (79%) of 
the discrepant specimens received by PHE. The first 
19 specimens were referred to the World Health 
Organization Collaborating Centre for Gonorrhoea 
and Other STIs at Örebro University, Sweden and the 
remainder processed within PHE. The C1515T muta-
tion was not detected. However, two new mutations 
were detected. The first was a C1514T mutation that 
was detected in July from one symptomatic male (two 
specimens) in their 20s with prior heterosexual con-
tacts in the US. The second was a G1523A mutation 
that was also detected in July in a specimen from an 
asymptomatic female in their 20s; no information on 
sexual contacts was available. Neither mutation was 
recorded in the US National Center for Biotechnology 
Information’s GenBank. These two nvCT/AC2neg cases 
originated from 242,505 AC2 tests reported by labora-
tories using AC2 between 1 June and 18 August 2019. 
The sequences derived from these two cases will be 
deposited into GenBank.
Assuming the AC2 test data and referred specimens 
were broadly representative of the population, and that 
very few individuals would have had duplicate speci-
mens in the period, the upper 95% confidence interval 
boundary for nvCT/AC2neg prevalence among those 
tested in England was calculated to be 0.003% (1 in 
38,519), ranging from 0.004% to 0.097% by region, and 
0.001% nationally for F-nvCT.
A sensitivity analysis was undertaken to account for 
the fact that not all reference laboratory investigations 
had been completed (denominator = 220,985 AC2 
tests). The nvCT/AC2neg prevalence estimates pro-
duced by the sensitivity analysis (0.003% for England, 
Table 1
Aptima Combo 2 (AC2) Chlamydia trachomatis tests expected and reported by region, England, 1 Junea–18 August 2019 
(n = 37)
Region Laboratories using AC2
Laboratories using 
AC2 and reporting in 
period
Weekly 
AC2 tests 
expected
Number of 
reporting 
weeks
Estimated AC2 
tests expected 
in periodb
AC2 tests 
reported
AC2 tests reported 
as percentage of 
estimated (%)
East Midlands 2 2 990 10 9,757 7,355 75
East of England 5 3 1,165 10 11,650 3,077 26
London 5 4 13,680 9 123,117 82,753 67
North East 1 1 563 7 3,862 3,966 103
North Westc 7 7 4,221 11 47,030 65,935 140
South East 5 3 3,438 8 27,504 10,471 38
South West 4 4 3,353 10 33,054 31,510 95
West Midlands 3 3 3,245 7 23,641 23,747 100
Yorkshire and 
Humber 5 4 3,180 9 28,164 13,691 49
Total 37 31 33,834 NA 307,779d 242,505 79
NA: not applicable.
a Two Public Health England laboratories were asked to initiate retesting before the Hologic Inc. Field Safety Notice [3].
b The values in the column may not match the product of weekly AC2 tests expected multiplied by reporting weeks because of the rounding of 
AC2 expected weekly tests and reporting weeks.
c Isle of Man included in North West subtotals.
d The total for all of England is calculated from the sum of estimated AC2 tests expected in the period, not the product of weekly AC2 tests 
expected multiplied by reporting weeks.
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0.004–0.109% by region) were similar to the original 
estimates.
Discussion
Despite extensive investigation, there is no evidence 
of the presence of F-nvCT in England to date. However, 
investigations did identify two previously unpublished 
variants that had resulted in false-negative AC2 tests. 
Prevalence of nvCT/AC2neg was estimated to be very 
low; likely fewer than 0.003% nationally and less than 
0.1% at a regional level. These estimates should be 
considered in the context of a 0.3% false-negative yield 
expected from normal AC2 test performance assuming 
an overall sensitivity of 94.5% [7] and an observed CT 
prevalence of 5.8%. As so few individuals were likely to 
have received a false-negative test result before June 
2019, a patient recall was not indicated.
Two other countries, Finland and Sweden, have pub-
lished data regarding investigations to identify F-nvCT 
in their populations, confirming its presence [1,8]. Ten 
cases (denominator unknown) with F-nvCT identified in 
Helsinki and Turku, Finland were reported in April 2019. 
Based on their RLU values, 0.4% of 9,472 tested speci-
mens (6% of CT-positives) in Turku were suspected to 
contain the variant in late 2018 [1]. In Örebro, Sweden, 
F-nvCT was identified in two discrepant specimens 
sequenced (1.3% of CT-positives) [8]. Other variants 
were not reported, but the number of discrepant speci-
mens sequenced was much fewer than in England.
This new variant CT event follows the earlier Swedish 
variant-CT (swCT) in 2006 [9], where a 377-bp dele-
tion in the 7.5-kb chlamydial cryptic plasmid prevented 
detection by two widely used NAATs [10]. Strains lack-
ing the entire 7.5-kb chlamydial cryptic plasmid have 
been reported, most recently from Australia [11,12]. 
These variant CT events, including the current event, 
demonstrate genetic diversity within NAAT target sites. 
The swCT spread throughout Sweden and its ability 
to escape detection was thought to confer a survival 
advantage, increasing the strain reproductive rate [13]. 
However, only one to two cases of swCT were found 
in Norway, Denmark [14], Ireland [14] and France [15]. 
Our estimates of very low nvCT/AC2neg prevalence and 
the small number of cases of the 2006 swCT detected 
outside of Sweden suggests that transmission also 
depends on host population contact dynamics and 
health-seeking behaviour, as well as health service 
factors.
Though the emergence of further variants able to evade 
detection by specific NAATs may occur, adverse impacts 
of such may be largely prevented by using CT-diagnostic 
tests with multiple molecular targets. Surveillance 
methods could also be developed. National sentinel 
surveillance for mutant strains could be introduced, 
similar to the technique used in the Netherlands to 
monitor the potential introduction of swCT [16]. This 
would involve subjecting a sub-set of CT clinical speci-
mens to alternative NAAT tests with different molecular 
targets, or a variant-specific NAAT. Statistical process 
control (SPC) methods could also be used to compare 
the observed percentage of CT-positive samples with 
those expected from historic data to flag a deviation. 
However, detecting a small number of cases potentially 
confined to only one region using SPC methods may 
be difficult as it requires reliable, standardised speci-
men and data flows. Conducting rapid, prospective, ad 
hoc surveillance to a regional geographical granular-
ity when a new variant is suspected, the methods we 
describe here, is also an alternative approach.
Table 2
Results of retesting Aptima Combo 2 (AC2) Chlamydia trachomatis specimens with Aptima Chlamydia trachomatis assay 
(ACT)a by region, England, 1 Juneb–18 August 2019
Region AC2 tests reported AC2 tests retested by ACT Re-test percent (%) Discrepants receivedc
East Midlands 7,355 78 1.1 4
East of England 3,077 39 1.3 0
London 82,753 6,004 7.3 74
North East 3,966 12 0.3 3
North Westd 65,935 3,774 5.7 62
South East 10,471 307 2.9 30
South West 31,510 392 1.2 32
West Midlands 23,747 688 2.9 29
Yorkshire and Humber 13,691 224 1.6 32
Total 242,505 11,518 4.7 266
a Specimens eligible for retest were defined as per the Hologic Inc. Field Safety Notice [3].
b Two Public Health England laboratories were asked to initiate retesting before the Hologic Inc. Field Safety Notice [3].
c Refers to discrepant specimens received by Public Health England Colindale for reference laboratory investigations.
d Isle of Man included in North West subtotals.
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Provided the FSN is adhered to, current reflex test-
ing arrangements should prevent nvCT/AC2neg vari-
ants that prospectively arise or are introduced into 
England from escaping detection. This reflex testing 
should continue until a revised version of the AC2 test 
is deployed. Even so, further novel variants escaping 
CT-NAAT detection may arise. F-nvCT [1] and the variant 
recently reported from Australia [11] were discovered 
because of the recognition of discrepant CT results 
from different NAATs. Continued vigilance is required 
from clinicians and laboratories to recognise false-
negative tests in the presence of symptoms  compat-
ible with chlamydia infection.
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